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DOING JUSTICE AND LOVING KINDNESS: A COMMENT ON HOSTILE
ENVIRONMENTS AND THE RELIGIOUS EMPLOYEE
Charlotte Elizabeth Parsons*
Professors Beiner and DiPippa have carved out a rather narrow area of
employment law to address in their article - religious discrimination created by
hostile environments in secular workplaces.' They do not discuss run-of-the-
mill discrimination such as the denial of jobs or promotions because of
individuals' religions. The professors do not address quid pro quo religious
discrimination such as the harassment that occurs when a job or promotion is
conditioned on the employee's joining a certain church, attending Bible studies
or adhering to some other religious practices. Although narrow, the main
problem addressed by the professors' article-religious employees' lack of
protection from hostile workplaces-is a tough one to solve.
I agree with the professors that both religious and nonreligious2 employees
ought to be able to work in environments free from religious hostility. The
problem is that one person's religious freedom creates another's hostile
environment. Yet it is no answer to simply eliminate all religious expression
from the workplace. One person's nonhostile, religion-free environment
tramples on another's free exercise of religion, creating a different kind of
hostile environment. Title VII doesn't require the total absence of religion
from the workplace. Rather, it simply requires an absence of discrimination.
If only it were that simple.
Professors Beiner and DiPippa attempt to resolve the tension between
religious and nonreligious employees by application of hostile environment law
as developed in the race and sex cases. They emphasize a "true" totality of the
* B.A. Furman University 1980, J.D. Florida State University College of Law, 1988.
Thanks to Lucy Yeats and others at the First Presbyterian Church of Bainbridge, Georgia, who
carried my load while I worked on this comment. Special thanks also to Bob Purnell. No one
could wish for a more loving and supportive husband.
1. Theresa M. Beiner & John M. A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 577 (1997).
2. Professors Beiner and DiPippa use the terms "religious" and "nonreligious"
employees in a very narrow sense in their article. By religious, they mean to refer to people
who consider themselves part of a religious group. The professors use the term nonreligious
to refer to people who are atheists, or who at least describe themselves as not practicing any
particular religion. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 581-83. I will adhere to these special
definitions for the purpose of this comment. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and courts have extended Title VII to protect the rights
of nonreligious as well as religious employees, see, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1996); EEOC v.
Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co, 859 F.2d 610, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1077
(1989), and courts have found atheists have the same rights as religious people under the Free
Exercise Clause of the Constitution. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). Thus, people
who do not believe in a god or practice a religion may invoke Title VII to protect them against
hostile religious environments created by employers or co-workers.
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circumstances standard for determining whether a hostile environment exists
and a welcomeness analysis "when appropriate., 3 The professors suggest that
religiously hostile environments usually occur in one of the following three
categories of fact scenarios: (1) nonreligious employees request a stop to
alleged harassment by religious employees who then request an accommoda-
tion; (2) hostile environments in which religious epithets and insults are
directed at religious employees because of their religion; and (3) hostile
environment cases in which the environment is not overtly hostile to religion
but nevertheless is hostile to a particular employee because of that employee's
religious beliefs.4
In this comment, I will briefly outline hostile environment law as applied
to race and sex. I will also evaluate Beiner's and DiPippa's application of
hostile environment theory to the three fact categories. Along the way, I hope
to suggest some refinements to the professors' hostile environment application
in an attempt provide the strongest protection possible for religious employees
while avoiding potential abuses of Title VII's protections in the name of
religion.
I. HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT LAW
Rogers v. EEOC5 was the first case to determine that Title VII's prohibition
against discrimination with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of... race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin '' 6 includes a prohibition against discrimination with respect to the
environment in which employees work.7 Rogers involved a woman with a
Spanish surname who alleged that her employer created an offensive work
environment by providing discriminatory service to Hispanic clients.8 The
Fifth Circuit was only deciding whether the EEOC could compel production
of certain records. 9 Thus, it did not elaborate on what it would take to prove
that a discriminatory work atmosphere existed. The important thing was that
the court determined that the "psychological fringes" are just as important as
economic fringe benefits and come under the purview of Title VII.O
3. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 641.
4. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 580-8 1.
5. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
7. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 237-38; Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)
(noting the historic importance of Rogers).
8. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 241.
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The ground work had been laid. Other courts expanded the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning to harassment involving race," national origin, 2 sex, 3 and religion. 4
The Supreme Court has ruled on only two cases involving a hostile
environment theory of employment discrimination under Title VII. Although
both dealt with sex discrimination, much of the Court's reasoning also applies
to hostile environments created as a result of racial or religious discrimination.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson 5 was the first hostile environment case
to reach the Supreme Court. Drawing from a number of lower court decisions
and the EEOC guidelines, 16 the Court confirmed that "Title VII affords
employees the right to work in an environment free from discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult."' 7 The court recognized, however, that not
every racial, religious, or sexual insult or epithet that creates offensive feelings
necessarily engenders a hostile environment.'8 To be actionable, the offensive
conduct "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."" 9
Although the Court did not specifically state how severe or pervasive the
offensive conduct must be to create a hostile environment, it noted that
Mechelle Vinson's allegations, which included rape, were sufficient to state a
claim.20
The Supreme Court also addressed the district court's finding that Vinson
had voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse with her supervisor, the lower
court suggesting that conduct in which Vinson voluntarily participated could
not be considered hostile for the purposes of Title VII.2 Whether Vinson's
participation was forced or voluntary was irrelevant, according to the Supreme
Court.22 Instead, the appropriate question is whether the alleged sexual
advances were "unwelcome."23
This evaluation of whether the alleged offensive conduct was welcome
does not appear to play much of a role in race cases.24 Perhaps this is because
11. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
12. Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977).
13. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
14. Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
15. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
16. Id. at 64-67.
17. Id. at 65.
18. Id. at67.
19. Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
20. Id. at 60, 67.
21. Id. at 68.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1271 (7th Cir. 1991) (refusing
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
it is hard to imagine anyone wanting (welcoming) harassment based on his or
her race. By requiring the plaintiff to actually prove that the conduct was
unwelcome in sexual harassment cases, the Supreme Court infers that sexual
conduct is an acceptable part of male/female work relationships and that it is
necessary to distinguish between these normal relationships and the rare,
undesired sexual attention women receive at work.25 Professors Beiner and
DiPippa appear to agree with the Supreme Court's inference that most sexual
conduct at work is welcome or at least a component of normal male/female
interpersonal work relationships and, therefore, that it makes sense to require
a woman to prove the conduct was unwelcome.26
For a number of reasons, I disagree with the professors and the Court on
this fairly major point, especially with regard to sexual harassment. One reason
is that the apparent assumption that most women welcome sexual advances
from coworkers is unfounded. In fact, just the opposite appears true. In one
study, researchers asked a sample of men and women what would be their
reaction if someone in the workplace asked them to have sex. Of the women,
62.8% said they would be insulted compared to only 16.8% who said they
would be flattered.27 In addition, more women than men consistently consider
more kinds of workplace sexual behavior to be harassment, including
deliberate touching, letters and calls, pressure for dates, and suggestive looks.28
Thus, it does not make sense to engage in a presumption that sexual behavior
in the workplace is welcome and require women (the majority of sexual
harassment victims) to prove the behavior is unwelcome. It is easy to
understand why most men would think that women welcome sexual behavior
at work. The numbers in the study flip flop based on gender. When asked
their response if someone in the workplace asked them to have sex, 67.2% of
men said they would be flattered by the proposition and only 15% said they
would be insulted.29
Another reason I disapprove of the unwelcomeness analysis is that it
allows the introduction of evidence based on stereotypes of women. The
to consider unwelcomeness as an independent factor); Brumback v. Callas Contractors, Inc.,
913 F. Supp. 929, 939 (D. Md. 1995) (stating that the plaintiff must prove the alleged conduct
is unwelcome to make out a prima facie case but then never mentioning the requirement again).
25. See also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J.,
concurring) ("We are not here concerned with racial epithets or confusing union authorization
cards, which serve no one's interest, but with social patterns that to some extent are normal and
expectable. It is the abuse of the practice, rather than the practice itself, that arouses alarm.").
26. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 585-86.
27. BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE 96 (1985).
28. UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD OFFICE OF MERIT SYSTEMS
REVIEW AND STUDIES, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 14-
15 (1988) (comparing figures 2-3 and 2-4).
29. GUTEK, supra note 27, at 96.
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Supreme Court in Meritor determined that testimony about Vinson's "dress and
personal fantasies"3 was "obviously relevant."3' This information could be
obviously relevant only if one believes that a woman's general dreams or
fantasies are obviously relevant to the sexual advances of a particular man. Or
if one believes the stereotype which says that women deliberately dress to
sexually excite or tempt every man she sees.3 2 Women dress the way they do
for many reasons. They may find some styles more comfortable than others or
dress a certain way to please a loved one or themselves. Women may even
dress a certain way because they feel good about their bodies and want to
highlight their good health.33 This does not automatically translate to women
asking for sexual attention just because of the way they dress. In fact, most
women feel that even if they dress "properly" and behave "properly," they still
will be the target of unwanted sexual advances at work.34 In light of the
studies indicating that most women are offended by sexual conduct in the
workplace, it is likely that women rarely dress to attract sexual attention at
work. Yet because of the stereotypes of women, juries and judges are apt to
draw wrong conclusions about a woman because of what she was wearing.35
I am curious whether any stereotypes of religious people might invade the
unwelcomeness analysis in religion discrimination cases. I will discuss this
possibility more fully later in this comment.
A third reason that I am dissatisfied with the unwelcomeness analysis is
the problem of coping mechanisms.
Typical coping methods [for women confronted with sexual harassment]
include: (1) denying the impact of the event, blocking it out; (2) avoiding
the workplace or the harasser, for instance, by taking sick leave or
otherwise being absent; (3) telling the harasser to stop; (4) engaging in
joking or other banter in the language of the workplace in order to defuse
30. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (quoting Vinson v. Taylor, 753
F.2d 141, 146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
31. Id. at 69.
32. See David Holtzman & Eric Trelz, Recent Developments in the Law of Sexual
Harassment: Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 239, 260-62 (1987) (danger of unfair prejudice is so great, evidence of dreams and dress
should be received only rarely).
33. Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 828-29 (1991) (Court's accepting
notion of "sexually provocative" clothing denies women the right to dress as they please).
34. In one study, a full 78% of women disagreed with the statement that "[i]f a woman
dresses and behaves properly, she will not be the target of unwanted sexual approaches at
work." Eliza G. C. Collins & Timothy B. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment... Some See It...
Some Won't, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 76, 90 (reporting the results of the review's
survey on sexual harassment).
35. Estrich, supra note 33, at 826-34; Holtzman & Trelz, supra note 32, at 260-63 (danger
of unfair prejudice is so great, evidence of dreams and dress should be received only rarely).
1997]
UALR LAW JOURNAL
the situation; and (5) threatening to make or actually making an informal
or formal complaint.
3 6
At least when dealing with sexual harassment, unenlightened courts have used
women's behavior to determine either that the alleged harassing conduct was
welcome or that the conduct was not offensive. In reality, this behavior is often
just the way the women are attempting to survive within an environment they
consider offensive and unwelcome. For instance, the judge in Highlander v.
K.F. C. National Management Co. 37 wrote that the plaintiff's own comments
were among the factors which influenced the court's conclusion that she was
not sufficiently injured to prevail in her hostile environment claim.3" When the
incident was first investigated, Highlander stated that she did not think that the
incident "was that big of a deal" and did not want to make "a big stink about
it."39 By focusing on those comments and other coping behaviors, the court
ignored the uncomfortable position Highlander was in as a fairly new employee
making a complaint about a district training manager. Her actions, on the other
hand, spoke loudly as to the effect the incident had on her. She thought it was
important enough to make a complaint to the co-manager of her restaurant, to
tell her husband about the incident, to request a transfer, and to tell her new
manager about the incident.4'
It is plausible that employees experiencing religious hostile environments
at work could also engage in similar coping behaviors. Without an educated
understanding of coping mechanisms, courts risk using those behaviors to deny
relief to employees who deserve it. Perhaps the effect of coping mechanisms
will depend on which of the professors' three fact categories the case falls
under. Or perhaps our culture is not so biased or at least not biased in the same
ways regarding religion as it is when sex is involved. Thus, an unwelcomeness
analysis may not present the same problems when dealing with religion as it
does when dealing with sex. The professors do not address this issue.
Also in Meritor, the Supreme Court accepted without further explanation
the EEOC Guidelines emphasis on the totality of the circumstances analysis in
determining whether a hostile environment existed." The problem with this
analysis in sex cases is not so much the concept as the application. Judges tend
to separate out each event and determine that the individual event was not so
36. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1506 (M.D. Fla. 1991)
(crediting expert witness's testimony regarding common responses to sexual harassment).
37. 805 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1986).
38. Id. at 650.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 646.
41. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986).
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bad.42 In doing so, these judges are not evaluating the true cumulative effect
or totality of the circumstances of the conduct.43 In addition, judges often
ignore the power differences between supervisors and those they supervise."
A difference in power can heighten the effects of harassment, adding to
victims' feelings that they are powerless to stop the harassment.
Professors Beiner and DiPippa also appear to have some trouble with
totality of the circumstances analysis regarding religious harassment cases.
This is evident in their call for application of a "true" totality of the circum-
stances analysis. One of their complaints is that judges separate individual
events (much like they do in sex discrimination cases) and then find that none
of the discreet events was sufficiently hostile to trigger a Title VII violation.
Another complaint seems to be that when the alleged harassment consists of
religious practices, courts presume a hostile environment exists instead of
engaging in "true" or rigorous analysis of the total circumstances.4"
The Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.' reaffirmed that
analyzing whether a hostile environment exists "can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances." '47 Some of the circumstances which may be
considered include "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive
utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance."18
In addition, the Court granted certiorari to the case to resolve a conflict
among the circuit courts as to whether the abusive conduct must severely affect
an employee's psychological well-being or cause injury to the employee to be
actionable under Title VII.4 9 The Court took a middle road between making
actionable conduct that is simply offensive and requiring the conduct to inflict
measurable psychological injury on the employee. 0 Psychological injury may
42. See, e.g., Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 964-66 (8th Cir. 1993);
Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1070, 1076 (E.D. Mo.
1990) (mentioning totality of circumstances but examining each event and gift individually to
determine it is trivial), aff'd, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991) (mem.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 918
(1992).
43. Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1484-85 (3d Cir. 1990).
44. See Caleshu, 737 F. Supp. at 1076. The judge pointed out that some of the incidents
occurred away from work, but he failed to recognize that the alleged harasser was able to
intrude on Caleshu away from the office precisely because of their work relationship. For
example, one incident occurred while Caleshu was picking up the harasser, her boss, from the
airport.
45. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 592-94.
46. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
47. Id. at 23.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id. at 21.
1997] 649
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be considered, just as all of the other circumstances, but it is not an absolute
requirement. So long as the environment could reasonably be perceived as
hostile or abusive and is perceived as such, no single factor is required to be
present." The emphasis is on whether the working conditions have been
discriminatorily altered, not whether a person's psyche or ability to work has
been impaired.52
Finally, the Court adopted a two-pronged objective/subjective standard for
the perspective from which the hostile environment must be judged. To come
under Title VII's purview, a hypothetical reasonable person would have to find
the work environment hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively
experience the environment as abusive.53 The opinion does not include any
discussion on this issue and leaves open the question of just who the hypotheti-
cal reasonable person is or should be.
This question of perspective is vital to carrying out the remedial mission
of Title VII. With race discrimination in mind, the District Court of Maine
explained:
Black Americans are regularly faced with negative racial attitudes, many
unconsciously held and acted upon .... As a result, instances of racial
violence or threatened violence which might appear to white observers as
mere "pranks" are, to black observers, evidence of threatening, pervasive
attitudes closely associated with racial jokes, comments or nonviolent
conduct which white observers are also more likely to dismiss as
nonthreatening isolated incidents. (Citations omitted.) The omnipresence
of race-based attitudes and experiences in the lives of black Americans
causes even nonviolent events to be interpreted as degrading, threatening,
and offensive.'
Thus, the District Court of Maine reasoned that the appropriate perspective
from which to judge whether a hostile environment exists is a reasonable black
person when racial harassment is at issue. A simple reasonable person standard
would let stand unremedied discriminatory conduct based on racial beliefs and
stereotypes prevalent in our society.5 Some, but by no means all judges have
recognized the power and potential pitfalls of perspective in judging sexual
51. Id. at 22.
52. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 21-22.
54. Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1515-16 (D. Me.), modified, 765
F. Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991).
55. Id.at1516n.11.
[Vol. 19
RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE
harassment cases.16 As a result, some courts employ a reasonable woman
standard while others use a reasonable person standard.
7
Professors Beiner and DiPippa recognize that the Supreme Court's failure
to expand on the objective reasonable person standard leaves unclear what
standard will be adopted in the context of religious discrimination.5" Will it be
a reasonable religious person? Which standard is chosen is too important
simply to say it is unclear. Perhaps the professors' reluctance to advocate for
a standard is rooted in the difficulty of defining it. They question whether a
general religious person standard should be used or an average person of the
same religious group of the plaintiff.59 Even then, the definition of group could
mean, for instance, Presbyterians as a whole, a particular Presbyterian synod,
plaintiff's particular Presbyterian church, a particular Bible study, women's
group or Sunday school class, or the board of deacons or elders. Is the
appropriate reasonable person an average member of one of these groups. If
so, which one? Obviously, the more narrowly defined a group is and the more
closely a plaintiff identifies with the group, the more likely it will be that an
average reasonable person from that group will support the plaintiff's
subjective perception that a hostile environment exists. This is not a question
of how far Title VII should go to protect an individual's quirkiness. Rather it
is a question of tolerance and how far the entire society is willing to go to
protect minority religious views and practices.
Again, professors Beiner and DiPippa recognize that the current state of
law on this point is unclear. Their failure to attempt a clarification could be
because they believe that who exactly should be the reasonable person is more
problematic in religious harassment cases than when dealing with race or sex
based discrimination. I do not think this is necessarily true. In any status
discrimination case, making the objective standard too broad will lead to an
56. Compare Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting reasonable
woman standard because "a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and
tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women"); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-09 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (relying on expert testimony to explain
difference between men's and women's reactions) and Estrich, supra note 33, at 845
("'[R]easonable person' of no explicit gender.... is at best meaningless, given that men and
women do not view harassment in the same way; at worst, it implies that the reasonable person
is male.") with Ellison, 924 F.2d at 884 (Stephens, J., dissenting) ("Application of the
[reasonable woman standard] presents a puzzlement which is born of the assumption that men's
eyes do not see what a woman sees through her eyes.") and Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805
F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986) (adopting perspective of reasonable person to give appropriate
protection to both plaintiffs and defendants), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987), abrogated on
other grounds by Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
57. See, e.g., Ellison, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (reasonable woman); Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611,620
(reasonable person).
58. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 588-89.
59. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 588-89.
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entrenchment of the current discriminatory, hostile norms Title VII was
intended to eradicate. 60  Thus, who is ultimately determined to be the
reasonable person will have a major effect on the professors' entire hostile
environment analysis. It will affect everything from determining whether the
conduct was unwelcome to whether a hostile environment was created under
all the circumstances. In light of the reasonable person standard's importance,
my objection is that the professors do not attempt to more clearly define it.61
II. THREE FACT CATEGORIES
The professors suggest that most religious hostile environment cases fall
within three fact scenario categories. Two deal with situations in which
religious employees allege discrimination because of environments hostile to
their religions. The other involves scenarios in which nonreligious employees
allege discrimination because of hostile environments created by religious
employees' religious practices. In each of these categories, the professors focus
on applying hostile environment law to protect the religious practices of
religious employees without unreasonably burdening the right of other
employees-not to practice religion.
A. Religious Slurs as Religious Harassment
Professors Beiner and DiPippa call these the "easy and noncontroversial
cases." 62 They involve slurs and epithets such as calling Jews "kikes" or
"Christ killers." I would add that these scenarios also include symbolic
conduct such as painting a schwastika on a Jewish person's locker. In addition,
I would include in this scenario conduct which, although not on its face anti-
religious, nevertheless is hostile and aimed at individuals because of their
religion. Examples of this could include equipment sabotage, the silent
treatment or other shunning activities, and even physical abuse.63
60. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (sex); Harris v. International
Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me.), modified on other grounds 765 F.Supp. 1529 (D. Me.
199 1) (race); Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1202 (1989). But see, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805
F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp 419, 430
(E.D. Mich. 1984)) ("Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments,
humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexualjokes, sexual conversations and girlie
magazines may abound. Title VII was not meant to - or can - change this."), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1041 (1987), abrogated on other grounds by Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17
(1993).
61. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 588-89.
62. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 614.
63. Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 1988) (urinating in gas tank
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I agree with the professors that these are the relatively easy cases. If Title
VII and other anti-discrimination laws did not protect religious people from
this kind of discrimination, the statutes "would fail to meet even the most
minimal expectations of their supporters." ' This kind of conduct has been the
basis of numerous successful race and sex hostile environment discrimination
claims.65 Judges appear to have no trouble reaching similar conclusions
regarding religious discrimination claims.66
One potential problem in this area, however, could occur when religious
employees or managers use religious slurs or epithets as part of their own
exercise of religion. Professors Beiner and DiPippa do not address this issue
directly. I will deal with it during my discussion of the next scenario.
B. Religious Employees Who "Harass" Coworkers
The professors characterize this scenario as one in which some employees
engage in religious activities on the job that harass or bother their coworkers.6 7
For instance, an employee's religious beliefs may require him or her to
proselytize, wear a button with a particular message, or pray in public. Other
employees may find these activities offensive or bothersome, particularly if
they are the target of the conduct as in the case of proselytizing. These other
employees then complain that the religious employee's activities have created
a hostile environment and request the employer to stop the harassing conduct.
At this point, the religious employee requests some sort of accommodation that
would permit him or her to carry on the religious conduct on the job in some
manner.
68
Up to the point that employees ask their employer to stop the harassing
conduct by the religious employee, this scenario is much like the other hostile
environment cases. Someone creates an offensive environment in terms of
race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. Once the employer knows or
should have known of hostile conduct, the employer's duty is to stop the
of woman's car); Hansel v. Public Serv. Co., 778 F. Supp. 1126, 1128, 1130 (D. Colo. 1991)
(noting that the plaintiff was hit over the head with a crescent wrench with such force that her
helmet was dented; shunned and ostracized by coworkers).
64. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 614.
65. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1473-74, 1485-86 (3d Cir.
1990) (suggesting that putting lime in shirts, destroying work product, and causing files to
disappear could be examples of sex discrimination when seen in the context of the total
circumstances); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1520-21 (D. Me. 1991)
(finding that sabotaged machine and attack by coworker with a sledge hammer in hand
constituted racial discrimination).
66. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 614 & n.236.
67. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 601.
68. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 595-96.
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conduct. 69 What is different in religious discrimination cases is that the First
Amendment guarantees the free exercise of religion (although this freedom is
not without some limitations)7' and Title VII attempts to provide some leeway
for employees' religious practices by requiring employers to make accommo-
dations which do not create "undue hardship" on the employer's business.7
Were it not for religion's special status, the employer's only duty would be to
stop the religiously offensive conduct. Instead, the employer is faced with
trying to balance the rights of employees on both sides of the issue.
Professors Beiner and DiPippa assert that in spite of religion's special
status, religious employees actually receive less protection under Title VII than
employees discriminated against because of other statuses.72 They suggest one
reason is that courts improperly inquire into whether the employees' conduct
is required by their religious beliefs rather than ask the very narrow question
of whether employees sincerely believe their conduct is required by their
religion. A second reason is an improper application of the accommodation
requirement in which courts have determined that undue hardship is anything
more than a de minimis burden. A third reason is that employers are trying to
secularize the workplace by taking action against religious employees even
before coworkers complain. They explain employers' actions by suggesting
that employers have more to fear from a claim by a nonreligious employee than
a claim by a religious employee because religious employees' claims are rarely
successful.73
1. Sincerely Held Beliefs
In determining whether an employee should receive an accommodation,
courts are not supposed to inquire into whether the employee's religion
requires a particular conduct.74 Rather, courts should only determine whether
the employee sincerely holds that particular religious belief. If the employee
is sincere in his or her belief, an accommodation should be attempted.75
69. E.g., Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 349-50 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
70. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) ("[T]he [free exercise clause]
embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in
the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the
protection of society."); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
72. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 595-610.
73. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 595-602.
74. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953); Heller v. Ebb Auto Co., 8 F.3d
1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993).
75. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 599, 602-03.
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Notice that a determination of sincerity looks solely at the employee's
subjective beliefs. The inquiry may look at such indicia of sincerity as how
closely the employee attempts to live in accord with the belief both on and off
the job and whether the employee has discussed the belief with anyone else.
The inquiry should not look at whether any particular religion adheres to the
employee's religious beliefs and practices. If the court did this, it would be
determining what is a religious practice or activity. Thus, it is simply irrelevant
whether other Catholics, Buddhists, Methodists, or witches believe the same
or follow the same religious practices as this employee who is a Catholic,
Buddhist, Methodist, or a witch. This particular religious employee may
sincerely believe he or she has special religious insight and must live out that
insight in his or her daily activities.
Professors Beiner and DiPippa point out that courts seem to have trouble
staying away from a comparison of mainstream religious practice to the
religious practices of a particular employee when trying to determine the
employee's sincerity.7 6 For instance, the parties in Wilson v. U.S. West
Communications77 stipulated that Wilson's beliefs were sincere. 78 Wilson
believed she was required to wear a specific, very graphic anti-abortion button
as part of her covenant with God to be a "living witness.,,7' Nevertheless, the
court pointed out that Wilson's supervisors, who were also anti-abortion
Catholics, asked her to stop wearing the button.80 It is not clear from the
opinion that the trial court relied on this fact when it determined that Wilson's
covenant did not require her to wear the button, but it seems likely.8
The professors imply by their discussion of this issue that employers
ought to be required to attempt accommodation for any religious belief or
practice sincerely held by an employee. They suggest that this would provide
real protection for those with minority religious beliefs, the people who are
most in need of Title VII's protections.82 I agree with the professors up to a
point, but there should be some limits.
When sincerely held religious beliefs result in religious practices by
employees which create hostile environments discriminating on the basis of
other statuses protected by Title VII- race, color, sex or national origin -Title
VII should not require employers to accommodate those religious practices.
Otherwise, Title VII's goal of preventing discrimination against the statuses
76. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 602-04.
77. 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
78. Id. at 1340.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1339.
81. See id. at 1338-41.
82. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 604.
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other than religion could be thwarted. For instance, members of the Christian
Identity religion believe "that white people are the true Israelites, and that
blacks are subhuman and Jews are 'the children of Satan."'' 3 If employers
were required to accommodate Christian Identity employees by permitting
segregation or other derogatory behavior against blacks, Jews or mongrels,
Title VIl's advances toward tolerance and equal opportunity in the workplace
would be eliminated.
So again, I agree with professors Beiner and DiPippa that employers
should be required to attempt accommodation of even minority sincerely held
religious practices. However, I would not require accommodation under Title
VII when the religious practices discriminate on the basis of race, color, sex or
national origin, which are protected statuses under Title VII. The professors
address religious practices which allegedly discriminate against other religious
practices in their discussion on the accommodation burden to employers. I will
do the same.
2. Undue Hardship
Title VII defines religion to include "all aspects of religious observance
and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is
unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective em-
ployee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the
conduct of the employer's business."" Courts have interpreted undue hardship
to be anything that creates more than a de minimis cost or burden. Professors
Beiner and DiPippa assert that application of the de minimis burden standard
clashes with rules developed in the context of Title VII's application to other
forms of discrimination and with the intent of Congress when it included the
religious accommodation requirement in Title VII.86 With this I agree. The
problem is fleshing out a standard which respects employees' desires to
practice their religions, respects employers' desires to run efficient, profitable
businesses and avoids colliding with the Constitution's Establishment Clause.
The professors admit the difficulty of this problem. Although they say
that no "hard and fast" rules can apply, they suggest that each accommodation
case can be equitably resolved by applying a few general principles. To start
83. SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, A DIVINE MANDATE, IN FALSE PATRIOTS 11, 11
(1996). For similar teachings, see CAREY DANIEL, GOD THE ORIGINAL SEGREGATIONIST AND
SEVEN OTHER SEGREGATION SERMONS (n.d.), which gives Biblical authority for the Baptist
author's arguments advocating separation of the races and inferiority of blacks. See, e.g., id.
at 32.
84. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(j) (1994) (emphasis added).
85. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
86. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note ], at 604-10.
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with, some initial time robbing and its associated costs should be permitted.
This would be in keeping with courts' interpretations in the context of other
statuses. In those cases, neither employee preferences (biases) which cause
disruption in the workplace nor customer preferences (biases) which cause a
loss of business qualify as appropriate reasons to allow the employer to
discriminate against blacks or whites, Jews or Christians, or whomever.1
7
Thus, one accommodation could be to let religious employees continue their
practices if the only reason other employees object is personal preference or
stereotype - even in the face of some cost to the employer.88
In addition, the professors would extend the principles which Steven D.
Jamar advocates for use in religious secular employer and non-religious
employee disputes.8 9  These principles are "accommodation, equality,
neutrality, tolerance, and inclusion." It makes sense to apply these principles
in determining an appropriate balance for religious practices on the job. The
tendency of courts to favor nonreligious practices and employees is not neutral
and almost promotes secularism as the only "religion" entitled to real
protection under Title VII.9 ' Favoring inclusion and accommodation would
give more diverse people equal opportunities for employment. Finally,
professors Beiner and DiPippa suggest that tolerance is the concept that most
vividly applies to coworker disputes. They argue that if coworkers were more
tolerant of the religious beliefs of their fellow workers, less commotion would
be created by what may be considered "extreme" religious views.92
Up to this point I agree with the professors' suggested solutions for
determining what are appropriate accommodations. I disagree with them on
one point. They state that if "the accommodation of an employee's religious
practices results in harassment of other employees based on these employees'
religious beliefs, the accommodation principle has gone too far., 93 They seem
to be saying that if accommodation of one employee's religious practices or
beliefs would be offensive to a second employee's religious practices or beliefs,
then the accommodation should not be required. However, this would allow
the second employee's religious practice to trump the first employee's religious
87. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
88. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 604-07.
89. Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title
VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 719, 780-89 (1996).
90. Id. at 780; Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 607-08.
91. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(stating that refusal to permit religious exercise could be seen "as the establishment of a religion
of secularism"); Thomas D. Brierton, An Unjustified Hostility Toward Religion in the
Workplace, 34 CATH. LAW. 289, 305-07 (1991).
92. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 608.
93. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 607 (emphasis added).
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practice. This would have the crazy result of honoring the one who complains
first. Instead, I would treat religious objections to accommodations no
differently than nonreligious objections and apply the same principles
discussed above.
3. Unwelcomeness Evaluation
Professors Beiner and DiPippa assert that not all religious discussion and
practice create hostile environments. Therefore, they would require a plaintiff
complaining of a religious coworker's religious practices to prove that the
religious conduct was not welcome. In the above discussion, I have already
critiqued the welcomeness analysis as applied to sexually hostile environments.
In a nutshell, current American culture does not respect women's protestations
against sexual conduct. If men believe "no" means "yes," the problem of
women plaintiffs proving that the sexual conduct was unwelcome may be
insurmountable. 94 Thus, it may be more appropriate to require the defendant in
sex cases to prove as an affirmative defense that his (or her) conduct was
welcome.
The professors allude to a similar problem when determining whether a
hostile religious environment has been created. However, instead of assuming
the conduct is welcome and not hostile, as in the sex cases, courts seem to
assume that almost any religious practice in the workplace is unwelcome and
creates a hostile environment.9' With that assumption under their belts, courts
do not engage in a rigorous totality of the circumstances evaluation. 96 This
presumption of hostility may not be factually based, is unnecessary and
unfairly favors non-religious employees. Perhaps this is why the professors
believe a welcomeness determination is appropriate in religious hostile
environment cases and that the proof of unwelcomeness should lie with the
plaintiff. Thus, they would ask whether a reasonable person, perhaps even
whether a tolerant reasonable person,97 would find that this religious conduct
was unwelcome and created a hostile working environment.
94. See, e.g., Kouri v. Liberian Servs., Inc., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 124 (E.D. Va.
1991), aff'd sub nom. Kouri v. Todd, 960 F.2d 146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied sub nora. Kouri v.
Liberian Servs., Inc., 506 U.S. 865 (1992); Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Mo. 1990), affid, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504
U.S. 918 (1992); Estrich, supra note 33, at 828. --
95. Cf. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 585-86, 592-93; Brierton, supra note 91, at 290
(courts assume illegal work rules or hostile environment created when employer has religious
motivation).
96. Cf Brierton, supra note 91, at 290.
97. Here, we are not talking about a religious person, because in these cases the victim
would be a nonreligious coworker or coworker of a different religious belief from the religious
employee alleged to be creating the hostile environment.
[Vol. 19
RELIGION IN THE WORKPLACE
4. Employer Fear
If courts respected employees when determining whether their religious
beliefs are sincerely held, if courts allowed for reasonable employer burdens
when determining whether accommodations cause undue hardship, and if
courts engaged in a true totality of the circumstances analysis when determin-
ing whether hostile environments have been created, religious employees
would be more likely to win antidiscrimination law suits. If this were to
happen, employers would have less incentive to attempt elimination of all
religious practice from the workplace out of fear of a law suit by a nonreligious
employee. This would allow for balance in the workplace. Nonreligious
practices would no longer trump religious practices, and the touchstone on all
sides would be tolerance.
C. Offensive Conduct or Displays As Religious Harassment
The professors discuss a third category of scenarios in which religious
workers complain about activities or displays which are not themselves
religious but which offend the employees because of their religious beliefs.9"
This category probably represents the most difficult to deal with in an
intellectually honest and consistent manner.
At first glance, cases in this category are similar to the "easy" cases
discussed above, because the offensive conduct is not necessarily religious in
nature. The difference here is that those engaging in the conduct often have
been doing so for some time without realizing it is religiously offensive.
According to the professors, only when a new (or newly converted) person
complains is the religious offensiveness apparent. In other words, this category
of behavior does not involve equipment sabotage, shunning, or some of the
other kinds of abusive behaviors discussed above. Instead, this category is
typified by objections to displays of Playboy or other crude sexual conduct or
talk in the workplace. This nonreligious behavior attacks religious employees'
souls, almost as an invitation to sin, rather than attacking their person.99
After my first reading, I was ready to agree with the professors' argument
that the law ought to treat this kind of environmental harassment similar to the
way it is treated in sex discrimination cases. Sex discrimination is a primary
research interest for me, and I would like to eliminate pornography from
employment using any means possible--almost. The problem in the religious
discrimination context is that there are no limiting principles. For instance,
98. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 621.
99. See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 634.
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eating pork could be considered religiously offensive to some. Suppose that
this religious person put coworkers on notice that this practice was offensive
when done in his or her presence. Should it be considered religious hostile
environment discrimination if the coworkers react by continuing to eat pork?
What if they start eating their pork with great ceremony in front of the religious
employee? What if they start taunting the employee? What if it were
religiously offensive for a man to shave his beard or anyone to eat on a fasting
day? According to the professors' theory, all a religious employee must do to
create a banned activity or display is put the employer on notice that it is
religiously offensive. Just about any behavior could be considered religiously
offensive to someone. I do not detect any limiting principle, especially
considering that religious belief is purely subjective. At least in the sex and
race hostile environment cases, sex and race provide some boundaries for what
conduct will come under the purview of Title VII. Religion does not seem to
provide the same kind of boundaries.
I spoke with Professor DiPippa about my concerns over the lack of limits
in this kind of religious discrimination case. He suggested that the common
requirements for proving employer liability in hostile environment discrimina-
tion cases-the pervasiveness of the harassing conduct, imputing knowledge of
the harassment to the employer, and the employer's lack of reasonable
response-provide sufficient boundaries. I am not so sure. In race and sex
cases, a single person can create a hostile environment by continuing to repeat
the offensive conduct."° One could imagine that being confronted day in and
day out by someone who eats pork sausage biscuits during morning breaks
would create a hostile environment for someone who sincerely believes that
anyone who eats pork sins. In my hypothetical, imputing knowledge to the
employer is easy because the religious employee will complain directly to the
employer. Once gaining knowledge, the employer generally is responsible for
taking reasonable steps to end the harassing conduct.' 01 If the employer
continues to allow the employee to eat pork sausage, bologna, or hotdogs in the
workplace, should the employer be liable for religious discrimination? Instead
of a total ban on pork, should the employer be required to provide separate
break rooms for the pork eaters so those offended by the practice will not be
confronted by it? Segregation of employees on the basis of one of the
protected statuses violates the principles of Title VII' 02
100. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1991).
101. Id. at 881-82.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1994); Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count
as Terms, Conditions or Privileges of Employment under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REV. 643 (1996)
(exclusion from outside activities which give employees exposure to persons with power at their
place of employment limits advancenent opportunities). Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 349
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What if wearing cologne or perfume, tatoos, or body piercing jewelry
(including earrings) were considered religiously offensive? I see nothing in the
suggested limiting principles that would place any bounds on what could be
considered religious discrimination based on the professors' definition of what
counts as a hostile environment in this category. Perhaps Professors Beiner
and DiPippa intend reasonableness to provide the bounds. Maybe they would
ask whether a reasonable religious person would find the allegedly offensive
conduct created a hostile environment. I have already discussed the problem
with the reasonableness standard. Make the reasonable person too general, and
minority religious practices will receive no protection. Make the standard too
narrow, and it fails to provide limits.
I do not have any suggestions for solving this problem. I understand how
the conduct the professors describe could, and perhaps should, create liability
for a religious hostile environment under Title VII, especially when the
harassment turns personal after the religious employee makes a complaint.1
0 3
I just cannot think of a consistent way to draw the line.
I do agree with professors Beiner and DiPippa that accommodation would
be totally inappropriate in these situations.' ° When dealing with hostile
environments of any kind, accommodation puts the onus on the victim of the
discrimination, requiring the victim to somehow adapt. Rather, the goal should
be to eliminate the hostile environment. Only in the very narrow category
mentioned above in which an employee's religious practices are alleged to have
created a hostile environment should accommodation be considered. Only in
those cases are religious employees asking for a flexing of employers' general
work rules as envisioned by Title VII.O5
III. CONCLUSION
Professors Beiner and DiPippa mentioned that there were not as many
cases dealing with religious hostile environments from the perspective of
religious employees as they expected."3 Perhaps this is because there is little
religious harassment in the workplace. Somehow, I do not believe we are that
tolerant-yet. A more plausible reason may be that religious employees are
discouraged from filing suit because, in the few cases on record, the religious
U.S. 294 (1955) (all other factors being equal, segregation of minority group deprives them of
equal educational opportunities).
103. See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 621-22 (religious employee's wife became
target of sexual comments after complaints made about co-workers' sexual language).
104. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 627.
105. See Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 1, at 627-28.
106. Beiner & DiPippa, supra note I, at 589-91.
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employee usually loses. Another plausible reason may be that religious
employees have not had the language to describe and discuss the harassment
they endure. This was a problem for people suffering sexual harassment until
the mid 1970s.
It is not surprising either that women would not complain of an experience
for which there has been no name. Until 1976, lacking a term to express
it, sexual harassment was literally unspeakable, which made a generalized,
shared, and social definition of it inaccessible. The unnamed should not
be mistaken for the nonexistent. Silence often speaks of pain and
degradation so thorough that the situation cannot be conceived as other
than it is .... 107
Whatever the reason for the lack of legal activity in the area of religious
harassment, Professors Beiner and DiPippa lay some good foundations for
adapting sexual and racial harassment law to religious harassment. Still, some
refinements are needed. When dealing with the easy category of religious
harassment, the professors should expressly include symbolic behavior and
other harassing behavior, such as equipment sabotage and shunning, to provide
as much protection to religion as the other statuses receive under Title VII.
When dealing with the category in which religious practices are alleged to have
created the hostile environment, a clear exception to the accommodation
requirement should be made when the religious practice discriminates on the
basis of one of the other statuses protected by Title VH. In addition, I hope the
professors will address the reasonable person standard as applied to religious
hostile environments in a future article.
Finally, I hope the professors will revisit their treatment of the category
which involves harassment created by activities or displays which are offensive
because of an employee's religious beliefs. The examples they give of people
having to choose between following their religion or keeping their jobs are
heart-wrenching. Still, there should be some bounds to what counts as hostile
environment discrimination in this category, and I see none. Until the
professors articulate some well-reasoned limits, I would advocate against
application of hostile environment theory to this category.
As always when I am teaching or writing, I am reminded of the prophet
Micah. This is especially so when writing this comment which overtly
addresses the fit of religion and law in a secular society. Micah told the people
that all God required was that they do justice, love kindness and walk humbly
107. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 27-28
(1979) (citations omitted).
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with their God.108 I hope I have lived up to Micah's admonition in this
comment.
108. Micah 6:8 (my paraphrase).
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